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The generally, but not universally poor track record of sanctions 
Economic and political sanctions are known to be ineffective in most cases. Witness EU 
sanctions against China after Tiananmen Square in 1989, and against Uzbekistan after 
Andijan in 2005. One study of 174 cases proposed that 34% of sanctions had at least been 
partly successful,1 but this was contested by another analysis of the same data set, arguing 
that only 5% had been successful.2 A recent CEPS study looked at four cases of EU sanctions 
in some depth – against Burma, Zimbabwe, Iran and North Korea.3 Overall, the analysis 
pointed to the obstacles that hinder the achievement of the desired results. The Iran case is 
still an important open question.  
Why should sanctions be used so often when they have such a poor track record? According 
to a former UK ambassador to the UN, the reason is that: “[T]here is nothing else between 
words and military action if you want pressure to bear on a government” (Jeremy 
Greenstock).4  Sanctions may therefore often become political statements more than anything 
else, and gestures to assure a minimal consistency between words and actions in the context 
of the domestic as well as the international political debate. 
The sanctions doctrine seems to have been adapted to these disappointing results by 
devising a new formula described as ‘targeted’ sanctions.5 The idea here is to avoid 
indiscriminate measures that might hurt the general population more than the leadership, 
and to aim instead at individuals who can be held responsible, or at key economic sectors. 
This is currently in evidence in both the EU and US sanctions against Russia, with 
individuals targeted with visa bans and asset freezes, and specific business sectors or sectors 
of the economy and financial system. 
                                                     
1 Gary Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition, Petersen Institute, November 2007. 
2 Robert Pape, “Why sanctions still do not work”, International Security, 1998. 
3 Clara Portela, “The EU’s use of targeted sanctions: Evaluating Effectiveness”, CEPS Working 
Document No. 391, Brussels, March 2014. 
4 “Do economic sanctions work?”(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10742109), 
26/07/2010. 
5 See Portela, op. cit., for a detailed account of this thinking. 
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The EU’s sanctions are aimed at stopping “Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in 
Ukraine”.6 More precisely, Russia is seen in its Ukrainian interventions to have broken every 
basic principle in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 concerning respect for the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of states, and repudiation of the threat or use of force. The Helsinki norms of 
the European security order were not a Western invention, but negotiated with Brezhnev’s 
Soviet Union as a pan-European act of historic significance. In addition, the current Russian 
interventions in Ukraine have been supported by a massive disinformation campaign about 
the struggle against the ‘fascists’ in Kiev, while at the same time denying Russia’s own 
military intervention, first in Crimea and then in east Ukraine.  
The present set of sanctions around the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle have also become an 
exceptional case in seeing sanctions and counter-sanctions between two major global actors, 
both directly and indirectly through the third party at the heart of the conflict. The dynamics 
of the impacts and interactions are far more complex than any simple generalisation that 
sanctions do or do not work. 
EU sanctions against Russia 
These have been intensified stage by stage, as the initial packages had no impact. In total 
they now comprise: 
 Diplomatic sanctions: The G8 summit scheduled to take place in Sochi in June 2014 became 
the G7 in Brussels; the EU-Russia summit, also scheduled for June in Sochi, was 
cancelled; talks on visas and a new agreement have been suspended; various bilateral 
cooperation programmes have been suspended. 
 Individualised sanctions: The number of EU visa bans and/or asset freezes have been 
progressively extended to a total of 119 persons and 23 entities in Russia and Crimea. 
 Economic sanctions: New operations by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are to be suspended (Russia 
had become the biggest beneficiary of EBRD operations); imports from Crimea are 
banned, unless certified by Ukraine; exports of military and dual-use goods are banned; 
export licenses will be denied for energy-related equipment (deep water development in 
the Arctic, and shale); access to EU capital markets and related services is severely 
restricted for targeted major Russian banks and corporations (Sberbank, VTB, VEB, 
Gazprombank and Rosselkhozbank). There is talk of suspending Russia from the SWIFT 
international bank payments system, but this is not yet decided.  
As regards impact, the Russian leadership purports to be unconcerned by the diplomatic 
sanctions. G8 does not matter anymore, and G20, which would be more serious because it 
brings in all the emerging powers, is not touched. The visa bans and asset freezes would not 
seem to be of concern to most of the targeted individuals, who, on the contrary, are more 
likely to feel they have received a medal of honour for having regained Crimea and raised 
Russian flags over Donetsk and Lugansk. Most of these individuals will not have foreign 
assets, and can choose other tourist destinations, from Turkey to Thailand.  
The main economic sanctions are very serious for Russia, however. While the G8 was 
suspended, a newly reinvigorated G7 has adopted a common position on sanctions. The 
financial sanctions are already having an evident impact. Former Finance Minister Alexei 
Kudrin has spoken of his serious concerns for macroeconomic developments, at least in the 
longer run, since for the moment Russia has large financial reserves of around $470 billion 
                                                     
6 Council Regulation (EU) No 960/2014 of 12.9.2014, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 
31.7.2014. 
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that could be drawn upon to compensate enterprises and banks that need to refinance 
borrowing on international capital markets. How serious these concerns are for the Kremlin 
leadership is hard to say. In Western financial markets Russian enterprises are now virtually 
shut out. This goes beyond the individualised banks, since there is a broader market refusal 
to take on perceived political risks, with the EU and US having said clearly that the sanctions 
can be further extended (or retracted). The arrest of Vladimir Yevtushenko on September 17th 
has raised apprehensions. Informed sources in Moscow interpret this arrest as an attempt to 
seize his assets in order to be transferred to Rosneft, which has $42 billion worth of credits 
outstanding that need to be refinanced. Furthermore, it is reported that the top three Russian 
banks are in need of $75 billion to re-finance borrowings over the next year. Just as this affair 
was beginning to look like ‘Yukos 2’, several leading personalities spoke out against his 
arrest in public,7 to the point that Yevtushenko was provisionally released from house arrest. 
These kinds of protest towards the Kremlin are rare acts for such prominent individuals.  
The key issue is how far the Russian leadership is worried about the progressive isolation of 
the economy from trade, investment and funding from the West. One argument advanced by 
‘liberals’ is that this will push the Russian economy into a state of stagnant backwardness. 
Others, for example more nationalist spirits in the Duma, see this more positively as an 
opportunity for Russia to become more independent from the West. Hard macroeconomic 
realities are becoming apparent, however. The rate of growth in 2103 was already seriously 
decelerating, and GDP growth is forecast by the World Bank for 2014 to be only 0.5%, after a 
fall registered in the first quarter.8 The Western sanctions hurt the general business climate as 
well as specific sectors, and are now combining with a serious decline in the oil price (of 28% 
from a peak of $125/barrel in April 2011 to $89 by 7 October 2014), with oil revenues serving 
as a crucial resource for the Russian budget.  
Russian supplies of gas have not been subjected to sanctions, although the EU seeks to 
diversify its supplies, for which there are ample possibilities in the medium to long run. The 
European Commission has published a list of 10 short-term projects (until 2016) and 13 
medium-term projects (until 2020), consisting mainly of gas pipeline network connections, 
reverse flow capabilities and increased LNG reception facilities to enhance supply options. 
There are also possibilities to increase supplies from Norway, North Africa and the Caspian. 
‘Optionalities’ is the key word being used to characterise this set of projects, which will 
permit the radical reduction of the EU’s dependence on Russian gas supplies if political 
circumstances make this necessary.9 For the moment, however, a stoppage of imports from 
Russia would begin to hurt the European economy, after some months of running down 
stocks. Moscow would seem to be in a wait-and-see mode before it concludes that its gas 
revenues from Europe are set to drop drastically. However, when Moscow sees this prospect 
becoming credible, even only by 2020, it will have another important negative factor to 
include in its economic assessments.    
There is also the Mistral affair. The two huge warships, whose supply from France was 
contracted by Sarkozy’s government, are ideal instruments for Russia to deploy its military 
power anywhere on the seas and oceans, but first of all in the Black Sea as a threat to Ukraine 
and Georgia, and then as a presence in the Mediterranean and Pacific. The contradiction in 
principle with EU sanctions strategy was initially glossed over by the exclusion of pre-
existing contracts. But the contradiction became too embarrassing, and France announced 
                                                     
7 Including Alexander Shokhin, President of the Enterprises Union, and Andrei Kostin, President of 
VTB bank.   
8 World Bank, Russian Monthly Economic Developments, September 2014. 
9 European Commission, “European Energy Security Package”, COM(2014)330 final, 28 May 2014. 
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postponement of delivery of the first Mistral ship shortly before the NATO summit in Wales, 
without cancelling the contract. 
Russian counter-sanctions against the EU 
Food imports from the EU, the US, Norway and Australia have been banned for one year. 
This has hurt some EU producers and suppliers, but the proportions are marginal. 
 Billion euro % EU GDP 
EU GDP 13,473 100 
EU total exports worldwide 1,733 13 
EU agri-food exports worldwide 120 0.9 
EU agri-food exports to Russia 12 0.09 
Sanctioned EU agri-food exports to Russia 5 0.04 
Minus products already restricted early 2014 3.5 0.03 
Sources: European Commission, Eurostat and DG Trade. 
The European Commission estimates that about 40% of EU agri-food exports to Russia are 
being sanctioned. Of the €5 billion worth of flows that are hit, €1.5 billion was already 
affected by restrictions imposed early in the year. The overall impact of the new sanctions 
may thus be estimated to be 0.03% of EU GDP. The Commission also intervened in various 
markets for fresh agricultural produce in August to reduce the market impact of the 
sanctions, putting certain quantities into storage.  
There is an unquantifiable negative macroeconomic impact through damage to the business 
climate, which at a time of delayed recovery from recession is a serious matter. The policy 
response blends in with the overall task of getting resumed macroeconomic growth, 
however, for which the European Central Bank announced, on October 2nd, a huge 
programme of asset purchases amounting potentially to one trillion (a thousand billion) 
euro.  
Russian sanctions against Ukraine and Moldova10 
These sanctions have been very extensive for Ukraine, as follows: 
 July 2013, ban on Roshen chocolates (company controlled by the subsequently elected 
President Poroshenko) 
 August 2013, severe customs delays for Ukraine exports to Russia 
 October 2013, ban on Ukrainian supplies of railcars, subsequently partly lifted 
 February 2014, ban on supplies from the largest Ukrainian poultry producer 
 April 2014, ban on cheese supplies from five Ukrainian companies 
 June 2014, ban on Ukrainian potatoes 
 June 2014, stoppage of gas supplies to Ukraine 
 July 2014, ban on Ukrainian dairy products 
 August 2014, ban on Ukrainian supplies of alcoholic products 
Most of these sanctions have been introduced on grounds of alleged non-compliance of 
Ukrainian supplies with Russian health or safety regulations. However, while the scientific 
                                                     
10 For a more detailed account, see D. Cenusa, M. Emerson, T. Kovziridse and V. Movchan, “Russia’s 
Punitive Trade Measures towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia”, CEPS Working Document No. 
400, Brussels, September 2014. 
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evidence for their justification is wholly non-transparent, the political motivation is obvious. 
The gas stoppage involves issues of price and debt, which are the subject of ongoing trilateral 
discussions with the Commission acting as mediator.   
Russia has further adopted a law empowering it to cancel the free-trade preferences 
accorded to Ukraine under the CIS free trade agreement of 2011, but has not implemented 
these pending trilateral negotiations with the EU (see below). In response Ukraine has 
adopted a draft law authorising the reciprocal cancellation of trade preferences towards 
Russia, which is not expected to be passed into law until after the October 26th parliamentary 
elections.  
Russia has also sanctioned Moldova with a similar list of agri-food restrictions, and in 
addition has, from 1 September 2014, actually cancelled the CIS free-trade preferences for 
Moldovan products, not just threatened to do so, as in the case of Ukraine.  
It is notable that Belarus and Kazakhstan did not follow Moscow in these sanctions, which 
means a breach of their customs union. Belarus becomes a commercial and transport hub of 
supplies to Russia, with various Moldovan, Ukrainian and EU supplies of raw agri-food 
products being processed in Belarus to the point of becoming ‘made in Belarus’ from the 
standpoint of rules of origin, and therefore passing legally into a Russia free of tariffs. 
Furthermore, there is an unknown quantity of ‘illegal’ supplies.  
Trilaterisation, EU-Ukraine-Russia  
On 12 September 2014 there was an important trilateral meeting of the European 
Commission, Ukraine and Russia, at Commissioner/ministerial level, at which Russia 
presented demands for amending the Association Agreement, which includes a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA). Part of the Russian argument was that 
measures were required to prevent the ‘need’ for Russia to proceed with the next phase of 
sanctions against Ukraine, notably the suspension of CIS tariff-free preferences (see above). 
The outcome of the meeting was an agreement by the Commission and Ukraine to postpone, 
until the end of 2015, the ‘provisional application’ of the DCFTA component of the 
Association Agreement. In exchange, Russia would not scrap the CIS free-trade preferences. 
After the September 12th meeting the Russian Minister, Alexei Ulyukaev, wrote to 
Commissioner De Gucht, in a letter leaked to the press, seeking to put this agreement into 
due legal form, and to proceed with further trilateral talks to resolve outstanding issues.11 
The most practical of these may be the question of technical standards and SPS regulations 
for Russian exports to Ukraine for whenever Ukraine implements EU standards. But other 
Russian requests, such as to amend the AA/DCFTA, are presumably out of the question. The 
Ukrainian minister said that “not one word” would be changed. Further, it has been reported 
in the press that President Putin felt it necessary to follow up the Ulyukaev letter with his 
own letter to President Poroshenko and President Barroso, threatening immediate retaliation 
if Ukraine took any steps towards implementing the AA/DCFTA, and demanding its 
“systemic amendment”, which would seem to mean an exorbitant widening of the 
September 12th agreement.12 
A more constructive trilateral process has been underway on the conditions for resumption 
of supply of Russian gas to Ukraine. There have been several meetings of the Russian and 
Ukrainian energy ministers mediated by the European Commissioner for energy policy, 
Gunther Oettinger. Negotiations have progressed on the price and debt settlement 
                                                     
11 http://www.veooz.com/photos/WHU~Ezy.html 
12 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/23/us-ukraine-crisis-trade-idUSKCN0HI1T820140923 
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conditions for resuming gas supplies at least for the coming months, to see though the 
winter. At the last trilateral meeting in Berlin on September 26th, a deal was tabled for a so-
called winter package, under which Ukraine would pay $3.1 billion of its debt to Russia by 
the end of the year in exchange for gas deliveries during the winter months at $385 per 1,000 
cubic meters. The deal is not yet finalised, however. 
Conclusions 
The EU and the US have deployed mounting sanctions against Russia for the most 
fundamental reason, namely because the Kremlin, in its interventions in Ukraine, has broken 
every basic norm of the pan-European security order enshrined in the Helsinki Treaty of 
1975. The NATO allies have said openly that they would not go to war with Russia over 
Ukraine. In these circumstances, in the apposite words of the former UK ambassador to the 
UN, there are no other means between words and war, apart from sanctions, of bringing 
pressure to bear. Of the EU and US sanctions against Russia, the effective closure of financial 
markets is far more important than the sanctions targeting individuals, and is hurting big 
Russian financial institutions. Russia’s financial reserves can take care of immediate needs, 
but the longer the sanctions remain the greater the macroeconomic costs, to the point of 
potentially becoming damage of strategic importance, and notably so if the oil price 
continues to weaken and the EU progresses faster and credibly towards being able to do 
without Russian gas.   
As regards Russia’s counter-sanctions, the food import restrictions are of marginal 
significance. The damage to the European business climate is hardly welcome, but the much 
wider challenge of pulling the economy out of stagnation is being addressed though massive 
monetary policy intervention by the European Central Bank. 
Russia’s sanctions against Ukraine look like becoming counter-productive in simple 
economic terms by stimulating a switch in marketing efforts towards EU and world markets, 
away from the Russian market. More fundamentally, through its aggression Russia has 
engraved itself as an enemy in the minds of most Ukrainians, as was the case in Georgia with 
the 2008 war: thus soft power losses for Russia.  
For the time being the sanctions and counter-sanctions between Russia and Europe formalise 
their mutual estrangement, with Europe’s trust of the Kremlin having sunk to the lowest 
level since pre-Gorbachev times. Russia is perceived as supporting a new frozen conflict 
zone in east Ukraine and playing a long and opportunistic game, with partial and temporary 
alleviation of hostilities against Ukraine to abate the sanctions, leaving open scenarios for 
resumed offensive actions later, such as for seizing a land corridor down to Crimea. If, on the 
other hand, Russia demonstrated concrete, credible and long-term willingness to switch to a 
cooperative peace mode with Ukraine, the EU and the US would no doubt be happy to scrap 
the sanctions. In the absence of such signals and binding commitments, the logic would be to 
sustain the most significant economic sanctions for as long as it takes, with preparedness to 
intensify them.  
